Software Sneak Circuit Analysis

RCI proposes to develop a software sneak circuit methodology to assist BMDO in responding to Mr. Gansler's anti-tampering policy memo. This methodology would embed sneak circuits into the code to obfuscate critical software/firmware and COTS/GOTScomponents and protect them against tampering. Sneak circuits would also be used to collect evidence of tampering. If our Phase I research is successful, we would be able to protect critical software/firmware components from tampering in a manner capablewith approaches used to protect hardware. Such compatibility is advantageous because it allows those using the technique to put a single, comprehensive test program into place to verify and validate that weapons systems comply with the anti-policyguidelines issued by the DoD Anti-Tampering Program Office in the Pentagon. RCI proposes to demonstrate the feasibility of its innovation during Phase I. During Phase II, we will implement a planned demonstration of the technology. Protection againsttampering is required to protect software/firmware used in embedded systems, both military and commercial. If successful, this effort would provide those defending against tampering with a sneak circuit methodology and associated toolset that they coulduse to systematically counter the threat.