Provably Secure Execution and Communication Paths for Safety-critical (weapon) Systems

This proposal focuses on strengthening DoD safety-critical (weapon) systems security addressing the gaps identified by recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that show DoD struggling with rising exploits on safety-critical weapon systems implementations even after they were subject to costly (both in time and in $$) testing and security certification . We propose a formally verified Trusted Execution Environment (vTEE) that supports a mathematically backed secure execution and communication environment to safeguard critical mission logic in safety-critical (weapons) systems implementation. This provably ensures that safety critical code and communications execute the way they are intended to without any adversarial involvement.   Our revolutionary vTEE technology provably and pro-actively cuts out a large class of software attacks (top 5 vulnerability classes accounting for 75% of all vulnerabilities over past two decades) and ensures that only the safety critical code and communications execute the way they are intended to without any adversarial involvement. This in turn enables vast reduction and potential elimination of on-going reactive cyberattack management  (e.g. via patches and security incident response) and (re-)certification costs. In addition, our vTEE provides a customizable safe-execution environment that houses provably secure execution and communication primitives that work seamlessly with existing rich OS environment (e.g, Linux, VxWorks, FreeRTOS) and applications.