Detection and localization of GPS spoofing signal emitters

Global Position System (GPS) spoofing, where malicious signals are used to manipulate GPS receivers into producing erroneous position, navigation and timing (PNT), is a real tactical threat in current military operations. There is a need to protect assured PNT (APNT) by detecting and localizing the sources of such spoofing. Such protection is needed, not only for fixed-site installations, but also for our warfighters on the move. This Phase II research will develop and test a mobile network of GPS spoofing detectors that is synchronized independently of GPS to detect and localize GPS spoofers. The system uses a multi-layered monitor design to detect single or multiple attackers using signal power and distortion, angle of arrival (AoA), GPS-INS, and network-based monitors. The network includes a relative-positioning and clock-synchronization function to ensure that all detectors have measurements that are precisely time-aligned, enabling time-difference of arrival (TDOA) localization of each detected GPS spoofer. Detectability is enhanced by chip scale atomic clocks, tactical-grade inertial measurement units, 3-axis magnetometer, and multi-antenna GPS AoA processing. While this phase of the project focuses on a vehicle-mounted detector, concepts of operations are in place for cooperative heterogenous networks of mounted and dismounted detectors in Phase III.